Introduction
Since the developm ent of the Institutional Dimensions of Global Envi ronmental Change (IDGEC) Science Plan in 1998 (Young et al. 1999 (Young et al. / 2005 , institutional interaction has become an im portant subject of in quiry. The Science Plan put institutional interaction on the agenda of global change research w hen only a handful of scholars had raised the general issue. Their w ork drew attention to the risk of " treaty conges tion" (Brown W eiss 1993, 679) and to an increasing "regime density" (Young 1996, 1) in the international system. Today it is widely recog nized th at "the effectiveness of specific institutions often depends not only on their ow n features but also on their interactions with other insti tutions" (Young et al. 1999 (Young et al. /2005 . M any environmental issue areas are cogoverned by several international institutions with governance also involving institutions at low er levels of societal and administrative orga nization (regional, national, local) (Young 2002b, 83-138) .1
Although research on institutional interaction is closely related to the study of the effectiveness of international institutions, it takes a distinct Perspective an d transcends the focus on individual institutions. Institu tional interaction is p art o f the broader consequences of international institutions occurring beyond their own domains (Underdal and Young 2004) . Exploration of such interaction supplements the traditional in quiry into the establishm ent, development, and effectiveness of individua international institutions. Focus turns to the relationship among institu tions, however, w hereas traditional institutional research addresses t e relationship between actors and institutions.
We have m ade im portant headway in knowledge about institutiona interaction since the inception of IDGEC. The IDGEC Science Plan identified three areas particularly w orthy o f research: the role of politics and political decision making and their relationship to functional link ages among different issue areas; specific types o f interaction especially with respect to their significance for the perform ance of the institutions mvo ved, and the exploration and characteristics o f interaction as they create synergy or disruption am ong the institutions involved (Young et a . 1999 (Young et a . /2005 . W e show th a t through a huge expansion of ot conceptual and empirical research, understanding especially of the secon and third research areas has im proved considerably. Although IDGEC s contribution to progress w ould prove elusive, as w ithout doubt provided an im portant focal point and inspi ration for research on institutional interaction. N o t least, it has provided an im portant forum for the coordination of research efforts and for the exchange o f research results.
O ur discussion of institutional interaction starts w ith a review of the P ica progress made as a result o f the study of horizontal interaction mong international institutions. Subsequently we exam ine the theoreti^e,°P™ent anc* ar §ue th a t we have m ade significant progress f-ifi ^ 3 t*ieory institutional interaction through the idenfvr>e« M ° 3 num^er °f relevant causal mechanisms and ideal nlovpH i * 1 We U, ltrOC'lJCe ^our Principal strategies th at have been emimnliraf-' ^ °ra t' on institutional interaction. An analysis of the national 0 lnst'tutlona* interaction for o u r understanding of interDenultimafS ltUtl°ns anc* environm ental governance follows. The area o f ve I'
exp^ores th e progress m ade in the specific research th at o f hnr T eraCti°n ' W hkh has lar8e)y developed separately from n u m b l of n mteraCti°n ' ^ attention to identifying a number of promislng avenues for T
he Growth of Empirical Analyses
The number of empirical analyses of institutional interaction by both s cial scientists and lawyers has grown tremendously over the past ^ ^ This work has confirmed the importance, ubiquity, and diversity stitutional interaction. Interinstitutional influence significantly 3 the development and performance of virtually all institutions. Gene ' the empirical research has focused on a limited number of ' hot spots A large potential exists for broadening the overall empirical coverag Here we review progress in the most prominent areas of r e s e a r c h . Studies by social scientists and lawyers alike have highlighted the po tential for conflict between the WTO and trade-related MEAs and have identified potential solutions. C ontributions have especially draw n atten tion to the ways in which the WTO, backed by its comparatively strong dispute settlem ent m echanism , w orks against effective global environ mental governance. The existing obligations under the WTO chill negotiations on MEAs because they constitute obstacles to agreement on environmental trade restrictions or limit the effectiveness of such restrictions (Brack 2002; Eckersley 2004) . WTO obligations also undermine the effective im plem entation of MEAs by protecting free tra e in goods irrespective o f the environm ental consequences of the underlying Production processes. The identification of the conflicting areas has led to the analysis o f various potential solutions, including mechanisms available in international law (Pauwelyn 2003) and options for institu tional reform of the WTO (Tarasofsky 1997; Biermann 2001b).
M ore recent studies have investigated in more detail the response o M EAs to the influence of the W TO. This has led to the insight that MEAs are n o t as w eak in this conflict as they might appear at glance. Trade-environment interactions are not a one-way street because MEAs have proved surprisingly robust in influencing the W TO . Despite the chilling effect of the W TO , more than tw enty M EAs comprise trade measures to date. Their proponents have found, and used, the room for maneuver to adapt to the W TO requirem ents while still pursuing their objectives with trade measures. Among other things this has led to spe cific efforts to avoid discrimination against nonparties (Palmer, Chaytor, and W erksman 2006) . The introduction o f trade-restrictive measures adapted in this way has in turn restricted the W T O 's regulatory scope and authority (e.g., O berthur and Gehring 2006b) an d has triggered a aptations on the side of the W TO to allow for resulting multilateral tra e measures. This has produced increasing acceptance of appropri ate y designed MEA trade measures as reflected in the interpretation of the W TO regulations by the W TO Appellate Body and in the proceedmgs o the W TO Committee on Trade and Environm ent. As a result, no dispute concerning the implementation o f an M EA has yet been brought before the dispute-settlement mechanism o f the W TO (Charnovitz 1998; 1 aimer, Chaytor, and W erksm an 2006, 187).
-i !! t^£Se resu^ts 'ndicate that the interaction between the WTO s is more balanced than some early analyses m ight have sugl -i r , j i'lcreas'ng num ber of studies during the past decade have f l i g h t e d the achievements of MEAs in shaping the balance between • • ° env*J'onmeilt. The emerging picture is one of an increasingly K n 'an<^ t^1US reco8mzcd) division of competences and labor bem een MEAs and the W TO (Gehrmg 2007) . C ertainly the current balf n°t j su®aenc o r satisfactory, and tensions m ay worsen in ■ UrC ase °n t^ie Persisting societal conflict between free trade flirt-,nVironrne)ma objectives. However, the latent interinstitutional cona o o e J T H ^ 3nd MEAS hl §hll8hted --y early analyses flirt line ° r e een managec* relatively successfully so far, as the conwould n0t ecome acute; ^ lhis observation can be further confirmed, it of instii-r°V1 C| an catlon th at the current decentralized management assumed" )°n! l intf raction has been more successful than traditionally assumed (see 'Implications for Pohcy Making,» below).
Climate Governance
illustrates th e iterature on institutional interaction in clim ate g o v e rn a n c e area The inr P* ? r , muIti' institutional nature o f this g o v e rn a n c e area. The international climate change regime th at is based on the UN Framework C onvention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol has an enormous scope. As a result, it overlaps and interacts with a multi tude of other issue areas and institutions in a variety of ways. In addition to the m ultifaceted and m ulti-institutional nature of international climate governance, the param ount im portance of climate change on the inter national (environmental) agenda has contributed to the emergence of a rich literature on the wide-ranging interactions with various other envi ronmental institutions and w ith institutions not primarily environment oriented.
A num ber of studies th at have explored interactions among the inter national clim ate change regime and other MEAs have in particular highlighted the potential hegemony of climate governance over other en vironmental concerns. The objective of maximizing carbon uptake by monocultural forest plantations may, reinforced by the economic incen tives built into the Kyoto Protocol, defeat the competing objective of preserving natural biodiversity-rich ecosystems under the Convention on Biological Diversity (Pontecorvo 1999; jacquem ont and Caparros 2002) . The climate change regime drove the adoption, in 2006, of an am end ment of the London dum ping convention that allows carbon sequestra tion in deep-sea deposits (International Maritime Organization 2006) . Similarly, activities under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM ), which helps fund climate protection projects in developing countries, have been found potentially to clash with efforts to phase o u t ozone-depleting substances under the M ontreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer (L. Schneider, Graichen, and M atz 2005) . At the same time the M ontreal Protocol has itself affected the Kyoto Protocol in various ways. O n the positive side, the M ontreal Protocol has informed -t J 1-" v*nous ways, vjn m e pusiuvc mv -----the design of several aspects of the Kyoto Protocol and has contributed to climate protection by phasing out ozone-depleting substances (such as chlorofluorocarbons, CFCs) that are also powerful greenhouse gases. On the negative side it has led to a growing consumption of certain fluorinated greenhouse gases regulated under the Kyoto Protocol With respect to nonenvironm ental institutions, m ost analyses have addressed interactions w ith economic institutions and, in particular, the WTO. In line w ith the traditional trade-environment debate, the W TO compatibility of multilateral or unilateral trade measures as a means for climate protection has been explored (e.g., C harnovitz 2003; Biermann and Brohm 2005) . In addition, the m arket mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, most notably emissions trading, provide a particular an gle for the trade-environment debate. In this context the question arises whether and to w hat extent international trading rules apply to trading in emission units created by the climate change regime. Furthermore, the relevance of international trade and investm ent rules and financial institutions has become an issue, particularly with respect to the imple m entation of climate protection projects under the C D M and Joint Im plementation schemes of the Kyoto Protocol (Cham bers 1998 (Cham bers , 2001 ). Beyond the core economic and financial institutions, the analysis of the interaction of the climate change regime with the International Civil Avi ation Organization and the International M aritim e O rganization (IMO) in regard to greenhouse gas emissions from international transport has highlighted the difficulties that can arise from regulatory competition and a lack of coordination among international institutions (Oberthiir 2003 (Oberthiir , 2006 . Further interactions of the climate regime w ith nonenvironmental institutions, such as the W orld H ealth O rganization, have re ceived less attention (van Asselt, Biermann, and G upta 2004) .
Ocean Governance
Ocean governance is a third area th at has attracted c o n s i d e r a b l e scien tific attention. The prominence of relevant research is first of all obvious from the aforementioned discussion o f both the W TO /M EA interplay and institutional interaction in climate governance, because oceanrelated issues play an im portant role in both areas (e.g., W TO and fish eries agreements; IM O and climate protection). In addition, studies have focused on various subsets of the large num ber o f institutions th at inter act in manifold ways in this area of governance. The large number of studies exploring fisheries governance is particularly striking (e. Research has in particular focused on a num ber of pertinent issues. A first focus has been on the exploration o f the interplay o f various insti tutions in particular geographical areas of ocean governance. Related studies have shed light on the interplay of various functionally differenti ated institutions in the governance of particular regions such as the N orth Sea (e.g., Skjaerseth 2000 Skjaerseth , 2006 , the Arctic (e.g., Stokke 2007; Stokke and Honneland 2007) , and A ntarctica (e.g., Stokke and Vidas 1996) . The aforem entioned studies on regional areas of ocean gover nance have frequently also addressed the effects of the nesting of regional arrangements or functionally specialized institutions (e.g., fisheries agree ments) into broader global institutions, most importantly the UN C on vention on the Law of the Sea (Vidas 2000a (Vidas , 2000b ) and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (e.g., Boyle 1999; Stokke 2000 Stokke , 2001a ). Yet another im portant research area has been the governance of particularly vulnera ble marine species such as whales. In this regard it has turned out that the existence of num erous functionally specialized institutions creates opportunities for forum shopping that might be exploited by interested actors. For example, the protection of whales, usually pursued within the International W haling Commission, might also be addressed under CITES (Gillespie 2002).
Other Areas of Empirical Research Noteworthy are tw o particular contributions by legal scholars. First, they have begun to investigate the relationship and m utual influence of vari ous courts and quasi-judicial procedures (e.g., Schiffman 1999; Shany 2003) . A recent dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom con cerning the UK M O X plant in Sellafield has, for example, been ad dressed by procedures under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the OSPAR C onvention, and the European C ourt of Justice (Lavranos 2006) . Form al rules on jurisdictional delimitation and more informal mechanisms (e.g., regarding inform ation exchange) that minimize the risk of contradictory judgm ents and jurisdictional competition exist to some extent and could be further advanced to tackle these issues. Sec ond, legal scholars have analyzed the consequences that norm conflicts may have in general for the system of international law as well as the means th at are available in international law to resolve such conflicts (Pauwelyn 2003; W olfrum and M atz 2003) . The resulting legal analyses have highlighted th at existing constitutional rules of international law, such as the lex posterior and the lex specialis rules reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, are insufficient. The resolution of norm conflicts frequently has to resort to a case-by-case approach of clarifying the situation. As one result, many international treaties in in ternational environm ental governance explicitly address the relationship with other treaties (M. Axelrod 2006) . Jurisdictional norm interpretation has also played an im portant role, for example, with respect to managing the tensions between the W TO and MEAs. In other cases a resolution has to rely on the political rather than the jurisdictional process of norm development and interpretation.
Other areas of environmental governance w ith possible interaction effects have received far less scientific attention. Only rarely studies have touched upon aspects such as the regional-global interactions concerning the N orth-South transfer of hazardous waste (M einke 2002) and have addressed European air pollution as an empirical field (Selin and VanDeveer 2003) . Given the fact th at virtually all areas o f environmental governance are influenced by several institutions, there is furthermore room for many more empirical analyses of institutional interaction to shed light, for instance, on the governance o f chemicals o r the protec tion of species and biodiversity. Even w ith respect to the W TO-M EA re lationship, global climate governance, and ocean governance, there is an enormous scope for further interplay analyses. In none o f these areas have existing studies yet provided a comprehensive picture o f the prob lems and promises of interaction. Also, studies of large num bers of cases that could provide a basis for com parative analyses have so far remained rare. To our knowledge our ow n research is the only exam ple of such a large-« study to date (O berthur and Gehring 2006c), although some scholars have begun to investigate particular aspects o f interaction by employing quantitative means (e.g., M . Axelrod 2006).
Synergy and Conflict
One of the m ost noteworthy results of recent empirical research concerns the relationship of synergy and conflict in the realm o f institutional in teraction. Whereas Keohane, H aas, and Levy (1993, 1 5-16 ) identified m ore interinstitutional synergy than they expected, early analyses of indi vidual cases such as the relationship among the W TO and MEAs fo cu se d on conflict and supported the notion that institutional interaction is problematic. Evaluating 163 cases o f environm entally relevant interac tion, we found in our own study th at synergy is, counter to frequent as sumption, at least as com m on am ong international and European Union (EU) environmental governance institutions as disruption (Gehring and O berthur 2006, 316-25) . The majority of our cases of institutional in teraction led to synergy, and only about a quarter resulted in clear dis ruption. Furthermore, disruption and conflict in m ost cases occur as unintended side effects rather than deliberate results. Undoubtedly conlct is n o t negligible and poses severe problems, especially in in te ra c tio n among environm ental and nonenvironm ental regimes; however, synergy dominates overall. Hence, the larger-« study points to a selection bias to ward the conflictive, m ore politically salient cases. M oreover, collective action is taken much more frequently in response to disruptive than to synergistic interaction. Positive effects of institu tional interaction are commonly "consumed" without further action, ir respective of the potential for further improvement that may exist. This phenom enon appears to be widespread (identified in about 30 percent of our cases). A potential for improvement where positive effects occur has been neglected m uch m ore frequently than in the case of negative (disruptive) outcomes. The higher salience so far of problematic cases of interaction may be explained by the fact that people generally react more strongly to the risk of losses entailed in conflict than to the advantage of additional benefits (Tversky and Kahnemann 1981, 1984) and by the presence of aggrieved actors struggling for change. This suggests that it may be w orth investing effort to identify potential for improvement irre spective of w hether the original effect of an interaction was synergistic or disruptive.
These empirical findings have im portant implications for current de bates about the reform of international environmental governance. These debates have been widely based on the assumption that conflict is the prevailing feature of institutional interaction. Concerns about disruptive interaction (between MEAs and the W TO as well as among environmen tal regimes themselves), incoherence, and duplication of work have been im portant drivers of both calls for a W orld Environment Organization (WEO) (e.g., Bierm ann and Bauer 2005) and more cautious bottomup proposals for strengthening coherence and environmental policy inte gration in global environm ental governance (e.g., Chambers and Green 2005; N ajam , Papa, and Taiyab 2006) . The aforementioned empirical results require a review of the basis for discussion of synergy and disrup tion and specifically suggest the need for more emphasis on preserving and enhancing synergistic institutional interaction as compared to mini mizing interinstitutional conflict.
Conceptual Progress: From Classification to Causal Mechanisms
The IDGEC project has facilitated a number of attempts to develop gen eral research concepts. Sound concepts are a prerequisite for more sys tematic research on institutional interaction. Starting in the mi 199 s, the search for a reliable conceptual foundation for institutional interac tion has moved from classification efforts to m ore general propositions about the driving forces of institutional interaction and the deductive identification of causal mechanisms, elucidating both the pathways through which influence can travel from one institution to another and the consequences of interaction.
Categories for the Classification of Institutional Interaction
The search for analytical concepts started w ith a num ber of categories for classification. These classifications are useful for a first-cut explora tion of the field of institutional interaction and establish valuable distinc tions. They do not, however, capture the forces driving interaction.
Preceding the IDGEC Science Plan, Young (1996) pu t forw ard fo u r types of institutional interaction and began to explore their inherent dynamics. He observed that issue-specific regimes are usually The IDGEC Science Plan proposed to distinguish between horizontal and vertical interaction (Young et al. 1999 (Young et al. /2005 Young 2002b, 8 3 -138) . H orizontal interaction occurs among institutions at the same level of social organization or the same point on the administrative scale. At the international level this kind of interaction originates from the high degree of fragm entation of the international system in which actors frequently choose to pursue their common interests by establishing new institutions rather th an expanding existing ones. By contrast, vertical in teraction addresses the influence of institutions across different levels of social organization or adm inistration. For example, the institutional de sign of domestic political systems shapes state interests and thus exerts influence on the design of international and European institutional arrangements (Héritier 1999). And global or regional environmental governance requires an appropriate institutional underpinning at the n a tional and local levels (see Galaz et al., chapter 5 in this volume).
M ost im portantly, the Science Plan put forward the distinction be tween political and functional linkages among institutions (Young et al. 1999 (Young et al. /2005 see also Young 2002b, 23) . Juxtaposing political and functional linkages provides an initial idea of some fundamental forces driving institutional interaction, namely, deliberate political action and underlying properties of the governance targets for international institu tions th at escape hum an control. A functional linkage was conceived of as a "fact of life," " in the sense that the operation of one institution di rectly influences the effectiveness of another through some substantive connection of the activities involved" (Young et al. 1999 (Young et al. /2005 . It would exist "w hen substantive problems that two or more institutions address are linked in biogeophysical or socioeconomic terms (Young 2002b, 23 ; also 8 3 -1 0 9 ). For example, action taken within the ozone regime on CFCs is immediately relevant for the climate change regime, because CFCs have ozone-depleting properties and are at the same time potent greenhouse gases. Political linkages, on the other hand, involve the deliberate design of the relationship between or among different insti tutions. They were believed to " arise when actors decide to consider two or m ore arrangem ents as parts of a larger institutional complex (Young et al. 1999 (Young et al. /2005 . For example, member states of the climate change regime assigned the operation of the financial mechanism of this institution to the Global Environment Facility, thus establishing a perma nent working relationship between the tw o institutions (Yamin and Depledge 2004, chapter 10) . The distinction between functional and po litical linkages adapts the concepts of functional and political spillover from neofunctionalist integration theory (Rosam ond 2000, 59-68) .
This approach, however, is burdened with considerable analytical dif ficulties (see also Stokke 2001a). It underspecifies the realm of institu tional interaction, because not all instances of institutional interaction fit either type: unavoidable fact of life or totally deliberate political de sign. Consider th at the difficult relationship between trade-restricting MEAs and the W TO is neither deliberately designed by the member states of either of the institutions involved, nor is it an unavoidable fact o life because it originates from intended political action. The distinction a so overspecifies the realm of institutional interaction because the two categories do not denote mutually exclusive types. Y oung et al. (1999/ 05, 53) CJlt institutional interaction relating to the causes and conquences o regime interaction, the nature of the influence at w ork, and incf> ■ 6 rcsPonses-interaction can take place n o t only because Z n ,0n! « re funCtionally or Politically linked, bu t also because they her™ 1SC * erent memkerships, so th at interaction occurs, for example, i r e i T '1 3 regI°na anc* a gl°bal institution operating in the same issue on whffl'i ' Ctl°n ^atCcrns can be expected to differ profoundly depending other " Cr °r n(f a ref me can unilaterally affect the development of anatine with"^ °Ut 1 6 consent' or even aw areness, of the actors opero b s e rv !fn tar8et/ e8im e-M oreover, political action in response to tions inv o lv ed 1'01153^ mteractl°n can occur within either o r all instituo f t Ï Ï T A ' Claf ifc a ti0 "s °f ¡»teraaion ill,«,rate the wide variety structure the field ^ SerVe 3S usefuI initial distinctions to e istinction between horizontal and vertical inter action is, like the distinction between synergistic and conflictual qualities of effect am ong institutions, now well established. Young's four classes of institutional interaction provide an analytical framework for more specific inquiries; however, they have not been employed to analyze the oretically the causal factors behind institutional interaction.
Causal Mechanisms of Institutional Interaction
A number of authors set out to investigate the forces that drive institu tional interaction and to identify general pathways clarifying how the in stitutions involved are related to each other. These attempts have yielded insights into how and under w hat conditions an international institution can influence another institution. Pointing to factors that might be im portant for causal analysis, these insights constitute a promising founda tion for the search for theoretical models that elucidate the causes and effects of interplay between o r am ong institutions.
In a series of studies on international resource management, Stokke (2001a; see also 2000, 2001b) proposed a set of four causal pathways through which institutional interaction may influence the effectiveness of the regimes involved. These pathways are derived from the major theoretical approaches of international relations. Hence, ' ideational interaction (originally referred to as " diffusive" interaction) relates to "processes of learning" (Stokke 2001a, 10) and implies that the sub stantive or operational rules of one institution serve as models for those negotiating another regime. This may, for example, help understand the rapid spread of general norm ative principles such as sustainability, pre caution, and ecosystem m anagement. "Norm ative ' interaction refers to situations where the substantive o r operational norms of one institution either contradict o r validate those o f another institution (e.g., in the case of the relationship of the W TO and MEAs). "Utilitarian" interaction relates to situations where decisions taken within one institution alter the costs and benefits o f options available in another institution. Interac tion "management," finally, relates to the political management of mtermstitutional influence, including the deliberate coordination of activities under separate institutions in order to avoid normative conflict or waste ful duplication of program m atic efforts.
Against this backdrop a group of European collaborators deve ope a number of theoretically derived models of causal m e c h a n is m s an more specific ideal types of in t e r a c t io n that demonstrate h o w influence can travel from one institution to another (Oberthiir and G e ring These models provide an account of how given causes create observed effects (Schelling 1998). They presuppose th at one institution (the source institution) exerts influence through a particular pathw ay on the nor mative development or effectiveness o f another institution (the target in stitution). Causal mechanisms open the black box o f the cause-effect relationship between or am ong the institutions involved (Coleman 1990, 1 23, Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998, 2 1 -2 3 ) and provide a microfoun dation for the analysis of institutional interaction (George and Bennett 2005, 135-45) .
The causal mechanisms approach suggests th at institutional interac tion is driven by one of four m utually exclusive general causal mecha nisms covering three levels of effectiveness of governance institutions: namely, output collective knowledge or norm s prescribing, proscrib ing, or permitting behavior; outcom e-behavioral change o f relevant actors; and impact-the ultimate target o f governance (Underdal 2004, , an c apter 2 in this volume). T w o causal m echanisms are located a 1 1 e output level and exert influence on the decision-m aking process of t e target institution. A third causal mechanism is located at the outcome ve , mvo ving changes of behavior of relevant actors, while the fourth usa mec anism occurs at the im pact level. The latter tw o mechanisms o not mo i y decision making of the target institution but rather its ctiveness within its issue area. The four causal mechanisms are e ieve to cover the full range of fundam ental rationales th at m ay drive institutional interaction. M ore specific ideal types are needed, however, . VC . eses about the conditions under which institutional in expected to occur and its consequences for e n v ir o n m e n ta l governance.
Institutlonal interaction can be driven by the j °f m ternational institution will be influenced in the source^n 'deaS H aa* 1992b) produced withs ltution modify the perception of decision makers oper ating within the target institution. For cognitive interaction to occur, the source institution m ust generate some new information, such as a report, revealing, for example, new scientific or technological insights or an in stitutional arrangem ent solving a particular regulatory problem, which is subsequently fed into the decision-making process of the target institu tion by an actor. The inform ation must change the order of preferences of actors relevant to the target institution and in this way affects the collective negotiation process and the output of the target institution. Depending on w hether an interaction was triggered intentionally or not, we can distinguish tw o ideal types of cognitive interaction.
If cognitive interaction is unintentionally triggered by the source insti tution, members of the target institution voluntarily use some aspect of the source institution as a policy model. For example, the compliance system under the M ontreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer influenced the negotiations on the compliance system under the Kyoto Protocol on climate change because it provided a model of how to supervise im plem entation and deal with cases of possible noncompliance (O berthiir and O tt 1999, 215-22) . This type of cognitive in teraction can occur between any two institutions, because international institutions share a num ber of functional challenges related to m onitor ing, verification, enforcement, and decision making. Also, numerous types of actors m ay pick up the information or idea and feed it into the decision-making process of another institution. Learning from a policy model can generally be expected to strengthen the effectiveness of the target institution, because it presupposes th at the members and subjects of the target institution collectively consider the model to be useful. Pol icy models, however, are frequently modified or adapted to ensure their fit with the particular needs of the target (" complex learning , see E. Haas 1990). The policy-model type of interaction highlights how mem bers of an institution can improve the effectiveness of their governance efforts through the cognitive interaction involved in learning from other institutions.
If cognitive interaction is intentionally triggered by the source institu tion, it takes the form of a request by the source institution for assistance from the target institution. For example, the W orld Customs Organiza tion adapted its custom s codes in response to a request by CITES, t us supporting the im plem entation and enforcement of the latter's trade restrictions (Lanchbery 2006) . A request for assistance requires that the issue areas involved overlap, because adaptation by the target institution would otherwise be meaningless for the source institution. Moreover, it will usually be successful only if the requested adaptation is either bene ficial for, or at least indifferent to, the effectiveness of the target institu tion. Members of an institution cannot be expected to act upon external requests that harm their own institution. W hereas a successful request for assistance will generally produce synergistic or at least neutral ef fects for the target institution, it is intended to create a positive feedback effect on the source institution. Intentional cognitive interaction enables an institution to draw on other institutions in order to enhance its own effectiveness, even if it cannot exert pressure on the target institution to adapt its rules. The result is an instrum ent for furthering effective inter national governance.
Interaction through Commitment N orm ative com m itm ents may also provide the power behind interaction based on the premise th at interna tional obligations create at least some binding force on those they ad dress. For this form of interaction to occur, an institution m ust adopt a prescription or proscription that formally or informally commits its member states. Subsequently this com m itm ent m ust affect the p re fe re n c e s and negotiating behavior of these actors in another institution, a target institution, in ways that influence that institution's collective d e c is io n making process and output. For example, the W TO c o m m it m e n t not to discriminate against imported goods renders it m ore difficult for WTO members to adopt trade sanctions within MEAs th at w o u ld re in fo rc e the effectiveness of these institutions (Brack 2002) . Activation of this causal mechanism requires that both memberships and issue areas over lap at least partially. W ithout overlapping m em berships, no m e m b e r state of the target institution w ould be com m itted to obligations estab lished under the source institution. And w ithout overlapping issue areas, commitments established under one institution could not re d e fin e prefer ences related to issues dealt with under the other institution.
If the membership of one institution forms p art of the membership of another institution, a formally independent institution is " nested" in an other institution with similar objectives and governance in s tr u m e n ts . In teraction between nested institutions constitutes a mechanism for policy i usion within the same policy field and creates synergies among the institutions involved. It is typically easier to reach a g r e e m e n t within a smaller (e.g., regional) than in a larger (e.g., global) in s t i t u t i o n (Snidal 94). States committed within the smaller institution may develop a common interest in transferring their obligations to the larger institution governing the same issue area. For example, the ban of trade in hazard ous wastes w as m ore easily reached in a number of regional agreements than in the global Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of H azardous W astes and Their Disposal, but the latter was subsequently heavily influenced by the regional agreements governing the same issue area (Clapp 1994) . Interaction between nested institutions provides opportunities for "forum shopping" (exploration by actors of opportunities offered by different institutions to pursue their own inter ests). Its underlying rationale suggests that it will largely support the ef fectiveness of the target institution and occasionally also of the source institution. The identical objectives of the institutions generate com pat ible priorities and render disruptive effects highly improbable, if not impossible.
If a group of states addresses the same issues within two institutions pursuing different objectives, interaction through commitment creates mutual disruption of the institutions involved and, therefore, a demand for the delim itation of jurisdictions. Typically, institutions with different objectives will appraise a policy measure differently, so that disputes about the appropriate regulation arise. Environmentally motivated trade restrictions m ay be appraised as undesirable obstacles to free trade or as desirable instrum ents supporting environmental cooperation. In situa tions of this type, the members of the institutions involved possess a gen eral interest in some sort of separation of jurisdictions in order to avoid fruitless regulatory com petition; however, conflicting preferences regard ing the appropriate solution make it notoriously difficult to solve such problems. Jurisdictional delimitation cases pose the governance challenge of identifying measures honoring the basic objectives of both institutions involved. This does n o t necessarily require an overarching institutional structure b u t may be achieved through mutual adjustment of institu tional structures or even through careful implementation of obligations by the addressees. a group of actors pursues the same objectives within institutions controlling different governance instruments, interaction through com mitment will produce synergistic effects because it activates an additional means. Such interaction occurs in tw o stages. First, actors committe under one institution transfer an obligation to another institution. Secon , incorporation of the transferred obligation must mobilize an additional governance instrum ent, such as a particular form of law or a specific enforcement or assistance mechanism th at provides an additional in centive to implement the obligation. For example, political agreement achieved at the high-level International N o rth Sea Conferences paved the way for the acceptance of identical obligations enshrined in hard law within the regime for the protection of the N orth-E ast Atlantic (OSPAR) (Skjaerseth 2006) . Such interaction will regularly raise the effectiveness of both institutions involved, because the additional governance instrument benefits the implementation of both institutions simultaneously.
Behavioral Interaction Institutional interaction m ay also be based on the interconnectedness of behavior across the dom ains of institutions. Behavioral interaction will occur if behavioral changes triggered by the source institution become relevant for the im plem entation of the target institution. This form of interaction is located at the outcome level and affects the performance of an international institution within its own do main. Relevant states and/or nonstate actors m ust ad ap t their behavior in response to the output produced by the source institution. The behav ioral changes must affect im plementation behavior under the target insti tution in ways that are relevant for the target institution's effectiveness. If the Kyoto Protocol, for example, creates incentives to plant fast-growing trees in ways that encroach upon biodiversity, this undermines the per formance of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Jacquem ont and Caparrôs 2002). Behavioral interaction requires th at the issue areas gov erned by the institutions involved as well as the direct and indirect ad dressees of institutional obligations are close enough to m atter to each other. It does not depend on a collective decision within the target insti tution, because it occurs as the aggregate result of the behavior of actors operating within the two issue areas involved.
Implications of behavioral interaction for global governance depend, again, on whether the institutions involved differ predom inantly in their memberships, objectives, or governance instrum ents. If different (usually erlapping) groups of actors address a given set o f issues w ithin instiunions with similar objectives, behavioral interaction will always create synergy. Because of the m atching objectives, behavioral changes will au tomatically^ benefit both institutions. If a group of actors addresses a set o issues within tw o institutions th at pursue different objectives, interac tion will tend to result in disruption of the target institution, because e avioral changes triggered by the source institution are easily at odds with the objectives o f the target institution and may thus undermine the latter's perform ance.
Impact-Level Interaction Institutional interaction may also rest on the interdependence o f the ultim ate governance targets of the institutions involved. In impact-level interaction the ultimate governance target of one institution, such as economic grow th or the ozone layer, is directly influenced by side effects originating from the ultimate governance target of another institution. C onsider a stylized example: as cod eat herring, successful protection of cod by one institution, resulting in a growing population of this species, will unintentionally decrease the population of herring protected by another institution. In contrast to behavioral in teraction, interinstitutional influence in this case does not depend on any action w ithin the target institution or its domain but rests on the "func tional linkage" (Young 2002b, 23, 83-109) of the ultimate governance targets of the institutions involved at the impact level. It is increased pop ulation of cod, not hum an behavior, that leads directly to a decreasing population of herring. While impact-level interaction may rely on stable interdependencies of the biophysical environment, as with cod and her ring, functional linkages may themselves be subject to possible long term change. For example, economic growth promoted by the WTO and the resulting grow th in international transport currently lead to increased emissions of greenhouse gases, thus undermining the effective ness of the global climate regime. This kind of functional interdepen dence, however, m ight one day be overcome by technical progress or changes in production methods. The value added by the general causal mechanisms and their sub types is twofold. First, the models provide a promising foundation for the developm ent of an elaborated theory of institutional interaction. They allow for the form ulation of meaningful hypotheses about the pre conditions for institutional interaction and in regard to the effects o interaction for global environm ental governance. Second, they provi e analytical tools for use in structured analysis of empirical interaction cases, which can help explain how influence travels from one institution to another as well as which groups o f actors might be involve m t process. Such models, however, do no t replace the empirica exp orat °f existing interaction cases. They do not relieve the researc er establishing the causal relationship between the (potential y) interac g institutions and exploring alternative causal pathw ays. M oreover, they do not provide precise descriptions of all properties o f relevant interac tion cases. Being deductively derived, they cannot be empirically right or wrong (Snidal 1985) . Like game-theoretic models, they reflect the rele vant components of the different causal pathw ays th at a case of interac tion may follow and thereby assist the empirical analysis of real-world situations.
Principal Research Strategies on Institutional Interaction
Research on institutional interaction adopts different perspectives. The new e o inquiry has not yet produced one or m ore standard approac es. M eaningful studies on institutional interaction, like research n any ot er subject of the social sciences, have to be founded on some ic assumptions about the dependent and independent variables and eir re ations ip. Choices made in this respect influence the research questions th at can be pursued in a particular study. k °r lmpHatl>'' research design on institutional interaction has .
se °n decisions about the role o f actors and institutions. Syst-W k T T , CS ac^ress ^ causal relationship am ong institutions so 6 eP^nd ent and the independent variables are locate macro evel of institutions, rather than the m icro level of actors, of r / 1U 1£S ° 'nst*tuti°na^ interaction, including m any legal analyses 'V " " " "8 ¡»riscfaions, focus enttreiy on the sysresearrh « an ■ ^ j j acTJV'tles mI actors. In contrast, actor-centered the rlpnpnrl ate^ieS 3 ress actors either as the independent variable or institut 6 n T locating the other variable at the m acro level of more rrlr & eVant research may start from a given interest of one or tionai inteT11!-3Ct°rS and CXplore the opportunities to exploit mstitu-(forum sh aCK>n an 'nstrum ent to pursue these interests effectively fecT o f f lternatlVe1^ * m ay focus on the undesired side efestablishinp " Interaction ^at actors m ust take into account when effects oriri " f '8ning a §iven institution. The exploration of the state actor«; -i! a behavior of relevant states and non-R e s Z re&CtS " actor'centered strategy, o f a n a l™ " " T ' " "31 " " i " also focus on dtfferent "nits fluence in whi^h ^ OCUS °n Specii*c d -vadic cases o f interinstitutional in0ne ' " ' « "«on affects the normative development or performance of another institution (Oberthiir and Gehring 2006a, 2 6 -31). This perspective m ay require the decomposition of complex interac tion situations. Even a comparatively narrow interaction situation like the interplay between the W TO and MEAs with trade restrictions may turn out to be com posed of several com ponent cases running in different directions and passing through different causal mechanisms (Palmer, Chaytor, and W erksm an 2006). Research, however, may also take as its unit of analysis the overall patterns emerging from complex interaction situations, which m ight involve several institutions and possibly many in dividual cases of interaction. It will then seek to develop an integrated view on a complex phenom enon like the relationship between MEAs and the W TO or the institutional setting affecting the Antarctic environ ment (Young 1996) . This approach has therefore been called integrationist (Young 2007) . Squaring these tw o dimensions, we get four different research strat egies. Each of them is particularly well suited to address certain research questions and ignore others. Table 6 .1 illustrates the four strategies and indicates their core research question. IV. How, and with w hat effects, do actors change the institutional structure of the international system through institutional interaction? Inquiries located at the system level and focusing on one or more spe cific cases of interaction (cell I) address the core question of how, and with w hat effects, an international institution can an d does influence an other international institution. The focus is on institutional interaction effects rather than on actors' behavioral changes. The com bination of a systemic perspective with a case-oriented approach is particularly well suited for rigorous analysis of the causal m echanisms and effects of spe cific incidents of institutional interaction. Causal analysis requires identi fying a clear direction of causal influence running from one institution to another, which is difficult in com plex situations in w hich the origins and targets of influence are not readily discernible or in which feedback effects occur. This research strategy has so far proved particularly popu lar and has supported significant theoretical developm ent reflected in the determination of causal mechanisms and m ore specific ideal types driving cases of interaction (see "Causal M echanisms of Institutional Interac tion" above). Empirical studies of institutional interaction (as explored above in 'The Grow th of Empirical Analyses" ) have also (implicitly) employed this strategy. Likewise, studies analyzing the specific legal im plications of one sectoral legal system for the interpretation o f another one usually follow this research strategy (W olfrum and M atz 2003) .
Systemic inquiries exploring complex interaction settings (cell II) tackle the core question of how, and with w hat effects, institutional interaction affects the institutional structure of the international system. Because of the complexity of the empirical subject of inquiry, this research strategy will frequently start from empirical observation and description of complex settings or with a classification of interaction patterns. In contrast to case-specific research, it stays closer to the actual appearances of realworld interaction patterns, but it may be limited in its analytical grip on the forces generating the observed effects. Both conceptual w ork and em pirical work employing this research strategy are still rare. T he taxon omy of four different types of interaction pu t forw ard by O ran Young (1996; and see " Categories for the Classification o f Institutional Interac tion above) and the analysis of the emerging division of labor between the W T O and MEAs with trade restrictions (Gehring 2 0 0 7 ) p r o v id e ten tative examples for this approach.
The study of specific cases of institutional interaction using an actorcentered approach (cell III) examines how interested actors can and do e to exploit opportunities arising from institutional in t e r a c t io n or to avoid undesired interaction effects. In contrast to research falling into cells I and II, this strategy allows the application of existing theoretical and m ethodological tools for the analysis of collective-action problems to the issue of institutional interaction. Interaction effects are treated like any other effects originating from an international institution. This research strategy is particularly well suited for exploration of the ways in which actors deal strategically with expected or anticipated institu tional interaction in specific situations and how they exploit related opportunities for forum shopping. For example, Skjserseth, Stokke, and Wettestad (2006) ----rand nonstate actors also belong to this researc 2008).
The choice among these research strategies depends prim arily on the particular research interest. Although the com bination of tw o or even more strategies in a single project is not excluded, it renders the construc tion of a reliable research concept m ore am bitious. Unless the different components are convincingly integrated, conceptual broadness may re strict analytical and theoretical depth. A t the same time the different strategies are neither mutually exclusive n o r antipodes. For example, re search focusing on the exploration of individual cases o f interaction (cells I and III) may well provide a sound basis fo r the exploration of complex interaction settings (cells II and IV). Likewise, cell III research wi usually include insights from cell I inquiries. The research strategies therefore may well be employed in com plem entary ways. (Young 2002b, 31-32) . Institutions constitute social practices th at are not collectively decided upon, nor formally established, but produced, reproduced, and changed in a per manent interaction process of relevant actors (Wendt 1987) . If actors be have according to existing practices, they will reproduce them. If actors deviate from these practices, they will contribute to their modification or breakdown. H ence, social practices reflect " spontaneous" institutions that emerge from action (Young 1982a), whereas formal institutions and their " rational design" constitute but one among several ways to change an established social practice.
Implications for the Understanding o f International Institutions and Global Environmental Governance
Im portant aspects of institutional interaction can better be grasped analytically by the social practices approach to institutions. If the norm a tive structure o f one institution is significantly influenced by other institu tions, it cannot simply be traced back to existing preferences of relevant actors and the resulting constellation of interests. Two of the causal mechanisms uncovered (see " Causal Mechanisms of Institutional Inter action" above)-namely, cognitive interaction and interaction through commitment-dem onstrate how actors' preferences regarding issues dealt with by one institution can be affected by another institution. Simi larly, R austiala and Victor (2004, 296) have pointed out that power, interests, and ideas do not m ap directly onto institutional decisions be cause they are also shaped by other institutions. At a minimum, institu tional interaction, in addition to exogenous interests, thus significantly affects and shapes the preferences of actors. Accordingly, preference for mation cannot easily be separated from institutional analysis.
Institutional interaction also creates new institutional structures that are difficult to design rationally, because they evolve gradually from, and are continuously shaped and reshaped by, numerous decentralized interaction occurrences. Interaction may lead to a particular division o labor of the institutions involved or to the mutual reinforcement of their effectiveness, as an emergent effect that is not reflected in either of these institutions. Such interlocking structures (Underdal and Young 2004, 374-75) do not arise from collective bargaining or institutionalized deci sion making at the aggregate level. Whereas virtually all institutions in international environmental governance comprise their own permanent decision-making centers, if only in the form of a conference o t e par ties, no such decision-making bodies exist with respect to interaction be tween international institutions. Although the EU and domestic po itica systems possess unitary institutional frameworks that can a ress issues, the international system lacks a sim ilar capacity. To the extent that overarching institutions like the Vienna C onvention on the Law of Treaties or the International C ourt of Justice exist, they play a limited role at best. Under these circumstances interaction emerges from, and is influenced by, decentralized decisions m ade w ithin any of the institutions involved and the behavior of individual actors. Far from being designed, interaction thus evolves and is produced and reproduced through the practices of relevant actors.
If institutional interaction affects the im plem entation of obligations established under international institutions, it will m odify the meaning of these obligations. The causal mechanism of behavioral interaction emonstrates how an institution can affect the effectiveness of another institution at the outcome level (see " C ausal M echanism s o f Institutional nteraction above). Even if the form al rules o f the target institution remain unchanged, their effects and their m eaning as reflected in the so cial practices of relevant actors change significantly. Similarly, Raustiala an Victor (2004, 302) suggest that interacting institutions m ay address ega inconsistencies by means of m utual adaptation during implementaon. W ereas the collective-action approach assumes from a top-down perspective that actors implement fixed regime rules (unless free riding occurs), institutional interaction highlights th a t the social practices emerging in the implementation of one institution m ay also be shaped th Cr . r t,tUtK>m' toP_dow n im plem entation perspective may us provi e a valuable first cut, but it does not encompass the effects of institutional interaction at the outcom e level.
Implications for Policy M aking
The progress of research on institutional interaction achieved so far has several implications for policy making. First, institutional interaction requires that policy making take into account the broader policy impli cations of particular governance projects. Research o f the past d e ca d e has demonstrated the im portance of interinstitutional effects at all three levels of effectiveness: output, outcome, and im pact. It is now estab lished that environmental governance is frequently the result of sev e ral institutions and that an institution often has im plications for other insti tutions. Skillful policy m aking will have to consider the existence of several institutions cogoverning an issue area. Accordingly, the insti tutional environment of the institution in which a policy initiative is aunched will m ost likely have repercussions for its prospects of su cce ss regarding acceptance by other actors and effective implementation. And vice versa: the assessment of the im pact of a policy initiative on an institution should take into account "side effects" on and from other institutions.
While to some extent constraining policy making, institutional inter action offers a w ealth of new opportunities. Since the normative devel opment of an institution can be influenced not only from within that institution but also by other institutions, actors may engage in forum shopping (Gillespie 2002; Raustiala and Victor 2004, 299-300) . To the extent th at issue areas overlap, actors can choose the most suitable insti tution for a policy initiative. They can develop integrated strategies for the pursuit of their preferences that take into consideration the potential of the varying institutions affecting an issue area for both norm making and im plem entation. Interested actors might even establish a new institu tion with the sole purpose of influencing an existing one, as the N orth Sea riparian states did w ith the establishment of the International N orth Sea Conferences directed at strengthening the existing OSPAR Com mission (Skjaerseth 2006) . M oreover, they may create "strategic incon sistency" (R austiala and Victor 2004, 301), causing disruption of an unwanted institution o r regulation in order to increase the pressure for its revision o r cancellation.
The research results have im portant implications for discussion about the reform o f international environmental governance and the political management of institutional interaction. This discussion has so far fo cused mainly on the potential for institutional coordination and integra tion at the international level, m ost importantly by establishing a WEO ( First, synergy am ong institutions has been found to be at least as common as disruption (see " Synergy and Conflict" above). This finding contradicts the presum ption of m ost contributions to the debate on reforming international environmental governance that institutional in teraction m ight prim arily constitute a problem because it creates 'n^er'^* stitutional conflict and tension. If this presumption is revised, both the rationale for reform proposals and the yardstick for assessing their effec tiveness need to be adapted. In particular, institutional reform proposals will have to dem onstrate that they can, in addition to mitigating con ict, preserve and enhance synergy am ong institutions.
Second, institutional interaction research suggests th at the institutional fragmentation of international environm ental governance m ay constitute a strength rather than a weakness. Institutions w ith large regulatory overlaps appear to create substantial added benefit if they employ com plementary governance instruments, represent different memberships, or provide for significantly different decision-making procedures. W hat may at first sight appear as a 'duplication o f w ork" o r " redundancy" arising from institutional fragmentation, which is com m only deplored by policy makers and in the relevant literature, is in fact frequently a sign of effec tive governance. Slight differences in the instrum ents or procedures em ployed or the memberships of the institutions can m ake tw o (or more) institutions contribute in com plem entary ways to effective governance, as is best illustrated in the ideal type of interaction activating an " addi tional means (see Causal M echanisms o f Institutional Interaction" a ■ >°ve). Regulatory competition am ong different forum s can help prevent institutional sclerosis and provide an im portant driver of overall prog ress. Before pursuing a reduction of seeming "duplication of w ork," for instance, through a W EO or through the clustering of functionally reated institutions or elements of institutions in global environm ental gov ernance (Oberthür 2002; von M oltke 2005) , policy m akers and analysts would be well advised to check carefully the " hidden" added value of the current fragmented arrangements.
Third, research indicates th at disruption am ong international institu ions is main y rooted in competing institutional objectives, as is ap- Future research on institutional interaction holds the promise of fur ther valuable input to policy debates. In particular, knowledge about ef fective interaction m anagem ent has remained sharply limited to date. As research on institutional interaction advances, it could provide a more solid basis for exploring options for such management.
Vertical Interaction
Frequently environm ental governance involves institutions located at dif ferent levels o f social or administrative organization, most importantly the international, the national, and the local levels. This creates a vertical dimension o f institutional interaction as identified in the IDGEC Science Plan (Young et al. 1999 (Young et al. /2005 as well as in related publications (Young 2002b) . Vertical interaction has been studied almost entirely separately from horizontal interaction, although this separation may be predomi nantly the result o f research interests and scholarly discourses rather than theoretical considerations. The causal mechanisms discussed above maY turn out to provide an instrument for the theoretical integration of the two perspectives.
Studies on the vertical interaction between the national and the local !evels draw upon and expand the discussion on the preservation of the local com m ons. The "tragedy of local commons" (Ostrom et al. 2002; also O strom 1990) and the social problems of local communities tfying to establish reliable institutional solutions for the management and preservation of com m ons such as w ater resources or common s ing grounds through self-organization have been studied for a long time. Case studies treat national measures such as the introduction o Property rights th at w ere found to interfere with local solutions as unde sired external factors. The vertical-interaction perspective addresses such interference as interaction between local and national institutions (Young 2002c, 266-76) . As in the case of horizontal interaction, vertical interaction can be disruptive or synergistic, and authors have been pri marily preoccupied with cases of disruption, mainly of well-operating local institutions by national institutions. In m any cases national political institutions resulting in centralization of decision m aking, nationalization of resources, increased participation in m arkets, and priority for develop ment policies have indeed been found to affect established local institu tions adversely and to lead to the degradation of the local commons that had been effectively preserved in the past (Lebel 2005) . In the face also of the "tragedy of the com m ons," with its im plication of incentives for free riding, local communities nevertheless m ay also benefit from sup port of institutions located at a higher level of social organization (Berkes 2006b). Intervention by national institutions is reported to strengthen or rejuvenate local-level institutions, for example, by state recognition of local institutions, development of enabling legislation, cultural revitaliza tion, capacity building, and local institution building (see Berkes 2002, 296-300) .
Although the literature has so far predom inantly focused on the topdown influence of national on local institutions, vertical interaction con ceptually covers a broader realm. It broadens the research agenda to encompass interinstitutional influences of all sorts across all levels of social and administrative organization. For example, national political systems may both benefit from and be harm ed by regional or global institutions.
Vertical-interaction research is particularly related to the issue of scale (Gupta, chapter 7 in this volume) but should not be confused with it. Determining the appropriate level of institutional action stays central to the discussion of the appropriate " scaling" of an environm ental problem (Young 2002b; Cash et al. 2006) . The issue of scale raises concerns of effectiveness (at which level is a problem to be addressed to be solved effectively?) as well as power and interest (at which level do particular actors w ant it to be dealt with?). Although the lower levels of social or ganization may be closer to the environm ental targets and the related hum an activities, effective solutions of m any problem s require coopera tion at higher levels of social organization. In any event, scaling must not be conflated with vertical interaction. Even if the scaling up of an issue to a higher level of social and adm inistrative o r g a n i z a ti o n will almost inevitably cause vertical interaction between or am ong institu tions located at different levels, vertical interaction addresses the distinct issue of interinstitutional influence.
Institutionalized com anagem ent has been the preferred solution to conflictual interaction between national and local institutions identified in the literature. The prim ary solution observed by researchers for the management or m itigation of such conflicts involves comanagement ini tiatives w ith form al pow er sharing. M any comanagement arrangements, sometimes including stakeholder bodies, exist in the areas of fisheries, wildlife, protected areas, forests, and other resources in various parts of the world. They range from joint forest management in India to the im plementation of aboriginal resource rights in the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia (Berkes 2002, 301-7) . From a more con ceptual perspective, possible solutions that do no t rely on comanagement have received less attention. These include the gradual separation of the jurisdictions of the institutions involved, their merger, or the dominance of one of the interacting institutions (Young 2006). It is not clear, how ever, whether, or under which conditions, the effects of these solutions are malign or benign for environmental protection.
Interactions between or among local and national institutions domi nate the discussion. Vertical interaction at higher levels of social organi zation occurs particularly between the national and the international levels (Young 2002c, 2 7 6 -8 3 ). Independently from the relatively new framework of vertical interaction, the bottom -up influence exerted by domestic political systems on the shape and development of international institutions h a s been addressed under the "cooperation under anarchy heading (Keohane 1984; Oye 1985) . This perspective holds that oppor tunities for cooperation depend on the constellation of interests of the actors involved. A lthough states are here conceptualized as unitary actors whose interests may be shaped by national-level institutions, they constitute group actors th at are, in fact, themselves institutions. Research on policy m aking w ithin the EU revealed that national administrations frequently seek to establish their own domestically institutionalized solu tions within the higher-level institution (Héritier, Knill, and Mmgers !996). The influence o f in t e r n a t io n a l institutions on national political systems and institutions had also been intensely discussed long before issues of interaction appeared on the agenda (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Cowles 2001). The im plem entation of international rules has been foun to depend not least on the com patibility of international commitments with domestic institutions (see Galaz et al., chapter 5 in this volume). It follows th at the concept o f multilevel governance becomes an applicable lens for examination of the increasingly dense interaction between the EU and the political systems of its m em ber states (Hooghe and Marks 2003) .
While research on vertical interaction is still at an early stage, compo nents of a common analytical fram ework and research agenda are evolv ing. Existing studies have so far a t best focused o n limited numbers of cases of institutional interaction, and there is a lack of larger compara tive studies. Efforts have been made, however, to reexam ine existing case studies in a comparative m anner in order to extract m ore abstract an conceptually founded insights. In particular, the dem and for support o oca institutions by institutions located at higher levels o f social orga nization (Berkes 2006b) and existing institutional solutions for malign n n r i ? ! 011 p r°blems have been assessed (Berkes 2002). Likewise, Young i j j S made attemPts to develop a com prehensive analytical frameor a ressing the relationships between or am ong the interacting i utions, their core differences, the causal m echanisms th a t drive ver- Despite some differences, there is no theoretical reason to believe that vertical interaction operates fundamentally differently from horizontal interaction. Institutions located at different levels of social organization are hierarchically ordered, with a local institution operating in the shadow of a national one and a national one in the shadow of an inter national one. In contrast, international institutions, especially those that interact horizontally, are usually formally established independently of each other. Form al (jurisdictional) hierarchy m ust not be conflated with influence per se, as is seen in the well-known resistance of local or na tional institutions to the im plementation of higher-order commitments. Equally, the frequent form al independence of institutions in horizontalinteraction settings does n o t imply the absence of influence. Although the particularities of influence m ay differ considerably, vertical interaction may be expected to resemble horizontal interaction in many respects.
Accordingly, lessons may be draw n from one strand of research for the other. It may turn out, for example, that vertical interaction frequently runs in both directions, rather than predominantly targeting lower leve institutions. As has been found in research on scale, vertical interaction may also open opportunities for the deliberate choice of an appropriate level as a particular form of "forum shopping" (see Gupta, chapter 7 in this volume) if regulation at different levels of social and administrative organization becomes, to some degree, functionally equivalent.
Future Research Directions
Recent advances in knowledge about institutional interaction provide fertile ground for future research. As outlined, research on institutional interaction has made im portant headway over the past decade or so. Rather than exhausting the field, this progress enables us to identify a wealth of new research opportunities.
The Development of a Theory of Institutional Interaction
Theory development in this area has just begun. M ore reliable theo retical knowledge on im portant aspects of institutional interaction is needed. To be able to detect hidden instances of interaction and formu late reliable advice for policy m akers requires a theory o f the condi tions under which institutions tend to influence each other's normative development or effectiveness. The existing theoretically derived causal mechanisms and their subtypes m ay provide a prom ising foundation for the development of an expanded theory of institutional interaction. For this purpose the concept needs to be enlarged and elaborated in at least two directions. First, the models do not yet contain reliable informa' tion about the sufficient conditions under which the respective causal mechanisms are triggered. Second, knowledge ab o u t the development of institutional interaction situations is w aiting to be systematically developed. Do the actors involved tend tow ard full exploitation of the synergies inherent in a situation, or do such opportunities rem ain unex ploited? Do actors succeed over time in minimizing or avoiding disrup tion among institutions with different objectives, o r does conflict tend to prevail? The patterns of the m any cases o f institutional interaction that have as yet received little attention could also be m ore in te n siv e ly studied.
Empirical Knowledge
Such knowledge is still largely lacking in a num ber of im portant areas of institutional interaction. First, as observed above, the m ajority of exist' ing case studies on instances of institutional interaction has focused on a limited number of interaction settings, including the W TO -M EA inter face, interactions involving the climate change regime, as well as issues related to the governance o f the oceans and the broadly discussed founation of a WEO. Effects of institutional interaction in other areas, such as governance of chemicals or the preservation o f biodiversity, have received far less attention. While analysis of interaction in these fields can use existing analytical tools, it might reveal yet unknown patterns of in teraction and thus contribute to the progress of generalized institutional knowledge. Second, still very little is known about the significance of institutional interaction both generally and in specific cases. The efficient management of interaction situations depends on a more precise assess ment of the significance of interaction effects. Finally, we need more comparative and large-« studies th at allow systematic comparison of a smaller or larger num ber of interaction cases or situations. Such com parative studies prom ise to generate inductively generalized knowledge. Theoretical insights on such issues as the development of patterns of in teraction situations can hardly be derived deductively. They must be founded on the systematic and comparative assessment, or even on quan titative studies, of an appropriate num ber of cases in a structured and fo cused m anner. The management of impact-level interaction constitutes a particularly challenging task. This type of interaction addresses the functional interlinkage of the ultimate targets of the institutions involved. Whereas this interlinkage relies in some cases on barely m odifiable biophysical facts, in other cases it may be subject to long-term change th at might be influ enced by skillful management. For example, environm ental protection will in the long run depend not least on the successful decoupling of eco nomic growth (the ultimate target of the W TO ) from the global climate (the ultimate target of the climate change regime). Such m anagem ent will have to occur at least partially outside these institutions and within one or more other institutions, fostering, for example, energy efficiency or the development of new technologies, or governing traffic.
Institutional Complexes and Broader Governance Structures
These wider topics have so far largely escaped theoretically guided researc . Exploring systematically the nature, evolution, and consequences o sets of institutions that cogovern particular issue areas promises more integrated understanding (Raustiala and Victor 2004) . M ost im portant will be knowledge of the particular division of labor th at develops over time among a number of institutions cogoverning an issue area or of ■ ^* th 'Overlapping issue areas. It is one thing to examine how f ,C a ects relevant MEAs, or vice versa, and quite a n o t h e r to exp ore ow t e overlapping area of environm entally m otivated trade strictions is jointly governed by these institutions. Unlike the sector- 
